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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Constitutional Law-Vagrancy Ordinances-
Their Future and Alternatives
Following their arrest under the vagrancy ordinance of Dunn,
North Carolina, Richard and James Smith brought an action in the
district court to enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance and re-
quested a declaration of its invalidity. The Dunn ordinance pro-
vided, without definitions, that tramps, vagrants and persons under
suspicion found with no visible means of support should not be
allowed on the streets or other public places. On motion for summary
judgment, the district court held the ordinance was unconstitutional
as vague and overly broad, restraining freedom of movement, sub-
jecting persons to arrest and detention on suspicion, requiring
compulsory employment, creating a crime of the status of indigency
and imposing sanctions on the poor which do not apply to the
wealthy. Smith v. Hill, 285 F. Supp. 556 (E.D.N.C. 1968).
The Hill case is one of several recent decisions' which evidence the
increasing susceptibility of vagrancy laws to constitutional attack and
to possible declarations of invalidity. In light of this rising uncertain-
ty concerning the future of the vagrancy laws, it becomes necessary
to examine the value of these laws and also to examine some alterna-
tive devices in handling this particular problem.
Implicit in an examination of the vagrancy concept in the United
States is a discussion of the origin of the vagrancy laws, their pur-
poses, and their treatment in the American courts. The crime of
vagrancy originated in fourteenth-century England with the passage
of the first Statute of Labourers,2 which restricted the movement of
unemployed, landless persons in an apparent attempt to ensure
an adequate supply of cheap labor in the aftermath of the Black
Plague.3 At common law, itinerants without means of support were
punished as vagrants.4 Almost all of the American states early
' E.g., Baker v. Binder, 274 F. Supp. 658, (W.D. Ky. 1967); Alegata v.
Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 287, 231 N.E.2d 201 (1967).
223 Edw. 3, c. I (1349). For a full discussion of the history of the
vagrancy law in England and its development in America see Foote, Vagrancy-
Type Law And Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. Rv. 603 (1956); Sherry,
Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds-Old Concepts in Need of Revision,
48 CAL F. L. Rv. 557 (1960).
320 STAN. L. REv. 782 (1968).
4 See Note, The Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered: Problems and Abuses
of Status Criminality, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 102, 104-07 (1962).
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enacted statutes embodying some variation of this common-law
offense, and most vagrancy laws still closely resemble these statutes.'
Traditionally two views have been advanced to support the exist-
ence of vagrancy laws. The first is that vagrancy should be pro-
scribed because vagrants have a propensity to engage in criminal
behavior. It is argued that there is a valid social interest in seeking
protection from harm through punishment and prevention of crime.
This philosophy of the vagrancy statutes was adopted by the court in
District of Columbia v. Hunt,6 "A vagrant is a probable criminal;
and the purpose of the statute is to prevent crimes which may likely
flow from his mode of life." However, some commentators have
5 In the United States, vagrancy is a statutory offense in almost every
jurisdiction. Some states, including West Virginia, do not define vagrancy
and therefore the common-law definition is in force: "going about from
place to place by a person without visible means of support, who is idle,
and who, though able to work for his or her maintenance, refuses to do so,
but lives without labor or on the charity of others." Ex Parte Hudgins, 86
W. Va. 526, 529, 103 S.E. 327, 328 (1920). For an examination of the law
of West Virginia with respect to the crime of vagrancy, see Huntington v.
Salyer, 135 W. Va. 397, 63 S.E.2d 575 (1951). In Salyer, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals declined to determine the constitutionality of a
municipal vagrancy ordinance, but held it was inconsistent with the vagrancy
law of the state (common-law definition) and thus invalid under W. VA. CODa
ch. 2, art. 2, § 10 (v) (Michie 1966). West Virginia did have a vagrancy
statute in force at one time (Acts 1917, ch. 12, § 2). However, in 1920, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals declared this statute unconstitutional
as an unreasonable restraint on liberty and an imposition of involuntary ser-
vitude. Ex Parte Hudgins, 86 W. Va. 526, 103 S.E. 327 (1920).
It has been observed that the traditional vagrancy statute has been en-
larged to include over thirty categories. While the traditional vagrant was
an idler or vagabond, now the vagrant can be a drunk, prostitute or window
peeper. In addition to the enlarged scope of the vagrancy statutes, other
status crime statutes have been created, which include such categories as
public enemies, communists, and homosexuals. Lacey, Vagrancy and Other
Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1203, 1206 (1953). See
Note, The Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered: Problems and Abuses of Status
Criminality, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 102, 109 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered].
6 163 F.2d 833, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1957). Vagrancy statutes, "being the
exercise of the police power, are generally looked upon as regulatory
measures to prevent crime rather than as ordinary criminal laws which
prohibit and punish certain acts as crimes." People v. Belcastro, 356 Il. 144,
148, 190 N.E. 301, 303 (1934). In Perkins, The Vagrancy Concept, 9
HASTINGS L.J. 237, 253 (1958), it is stated that "society recognizes that
vagrancy is a parasitic disease, which if allowed to spread, will sap the life
of that upon which it feeds. To prevent the spread of the disease, the
carrier must be reached. In order to discourage and, if possible, to eradicate
vagrancy, our Legislature has enacted a statute defining vagrant persons
and penalizing them according to its terms. We see no reason why this
cannot, or should not, be done as a valid exercise of the police power."
Also it is stated that "[iun metropolitan centers . . . the vagrancy law is one
of the most effective weapons in the arsenal of law enforcement, and if the
officer's use of this weapon should be seriously impaired the security of
the citizen would be grievously weakened." Id. at 252-53.
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challenged this "breeding ground" premise," and recently the Court
of Appeals of New York, in invalidating the New York vagrancy
statute, took the position that conduct which has been demonstrated
to have no more than a tenuous connection with the prevention of
crime and the preservation of public order can not be termed
criminal.8
Even if the theory that vagrants are more likely to engage in
criminal activity could be proven, the question arises whether the
propensity to commit crimes is of itself a sufficient justification for
applying criminal sanctions. In Robinson v. California,9 the United
States Supreme Court stated that punishment for mere propensity
to commit an offense can, in many instances, be called cruel and
unusual. The requirement that some action be proven is solidly
established even for offenses most heavily based on propensity,
such an attempt, conspiracy and recidivist crimes. The requisite
action is easily found in other crimes of propensity (carrying con-
cealed weapons, possessing burglary tools, etc.), but it is often
argued that the crime of vagrancy lacks this action. This argument
is rebutted, however, by one writer who distinguishes between the
gist of the vagrancy offense and the reason for inflicting punishment.
He points out that the gist of the offense is the condition or status
of being a vagrant, just as the gist of the offense of conspiracy is
membership in the unlawful combination. However, the reason for
7 These commentators point to scientific studies which are available
purport to show little relationship between poverty and serious criminal
conduct. While one study showed that persons arrested for vagrancy have
a high rate of recidivism, this recidivism is limited to other vagrancy or
drunkenness offenses. Even those who support the "breeding ground" theory
admit that it does not breed serious criminality. The vagrant's criminal
conduct is for the most part limited to minor offenses. European studies
have also shown that vagrancy offenders are repeatedly convicted for va-
grancy, but not for other criminal conduct. Foote, supra note 2, at 628. See
Kinberg, On So-Called Vagrancy; a Medico--Sociological Study, 24 J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 552 (1933). For general studies on the problem of vagrancy, see
N. ANDERSON, THE HOBO (1923); W. DAwsoN, THE VAGRANCY PROBLEM
(1910); H. GILMORE, THE BEGGAR (1940).
8 Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739
(1967). The vagrancy concept has been used for many purposes including:
(1) to harass reputed criminals, (2) to justify an otherwise illegal arrest, (3)
to arrest for suspicion, (4) to arrest for investigation, (5) to round up a
certain class of known criminals (e.g. prostitutes) and (6) to validate an other-
wise invalid search and seizure. McClure, Vagrants, Criminals, and The
Constitution, 40 DEN. L.C.J. 314, 320 (1963). It has been suggested that
are not legitimate uses of the vagrancy law and are, furthermore,
violations of the letter and spirit of the vagrancy law as originally conceived
and enacted. Id. See Lacey, supra note 5, and Sherry, supra note 2.
9 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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punishment is the misconduct which caused that condition.' If
vagrancy is thought of as a condition describing a certain pattern of
behavior, its proscription may be more easily justified.
The absence of a vagrancy provision in the proposed official draft
of the Model Penal Code lends support to the criticism of the
propensity theory. The most relevant section in the Model Penal
Code makes it a crime for a person to loiter or prowl in an unusual
place or manner or at an unusual time "under cricumstances that
warrant alarm for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity.""
This section differs from Tentative Draft No. 13 in that the basis of
the offense was changed from justifiable "suspicion" that the actor
was engaged or about to engage in crime, to justifiable "alarm" for
the safety of persons or property. The American Law Institute
deemed this change necessary to save the section from attack and
possible invalidation as a subterfuge by which the police could arrest
and search without probable cause.
The second view supporting vagrancy laws is that, regardless of
any propensity to commit crimes, vagrancy itself is bad and should
be proscribed. It is argued that there is a social interest in
encouraging the idle and indigent to seek employment and thus
contribute to the general social and economic good. While this is
a legitimate object of attention, it has been questioned whether the
imposition of short jail sentences effectively encourages the idle to
seek employment.2 Also questioned is the legitimacy of imposing
criminal sanctions to effect the elimination of undesirable pests.'"
1 Perkins, supra note 6, at 258-60.
" MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Unless
impracticable, a peace officer is required to afford the actor the opportunity
to dispel any alarm by requesting identification and explanation of his
presence and conduct.
12 Quite the opposite result may be effected since arrest and conviction
for vagrancy may render such persons unemployable altogther. 20 STAN. L.
REV. 782 (1968).
'3 Hall, The Law Of Arrest In Relation To Contemporary Social Prob-
lems, 3 U. Cm. L. REv. 345, 369 (1936). The vagrancy law is useful in the
city "clean-up" campaign. It is used to sweep the streets and public
areas of drunks, tramps, streetwalkers and loafers. It also provides a means
to deal with unwanted persons such as the mentally incompetent, the
aged, the alcoholic, and the juvenile troublemaker. Conviction for vagrancy
allows the magistrate's court to place in detention all types of persons for
lack of a more convenient or practical manner in which to handle problems
which appear to have no immediate solution. Foote, supra note 2, at 631 (this
article provides a comprehensive study of the vagrancy law and its application
in Philidelphia, Pennsylvania).
While this nuisance problem is a legitimate object of attention, it may
be argued that it is not the proper object of criminal sanctions. '"The economic
1969]
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The view that vagrancy itself is bad may gain some support when
the offensiveness of the vagrant's style of life is compared with the
offensiveness of other crimes such as lewdness, indecency and
obscenity (offenses against morality and decency). Notwithstanding
the truth of the propensity theory, a possible reason (leaving aside
the question of justification) for the vagrancy offense is that the
mere presence of vagrants engenders a fear among persons that they
and their property are in danger. It is this fear which makes vagrancy
most offensive.
To determine whether social interests in proscribing vagrancy are
being satisfied, it is necessary to examine the treatment of the
vagrancy laws in the American courts. Courts in the past have
generally rejected constitutional challenges to vagrancy laws in
summary fashion.' 4 However, in a series of recent cases, vagrancy
statutes in several jurisdictions have been overturned on a variety of
constitutional grounds, including vagueness, violation of due process,
and equal protection.' 5 Probably the strongest constitutional argu-
purposes which once gave vagrancy a function no longer exist, and the
philosophy and practices of welfare agencies have so changed relief methods
that a criminal sanction to enforce an Elizabethan poor law concept is out-
dated." Id. at 649-50. The elimination of this problem is certainly a valid
objective, but it is doubtful that the use of criminal sanctions will be of
value in attaining it. Intermittent imprisonment is not a very useful method
of caring for or rehabilitating the inhabitants of skid-row. 20 STAN. L. R V.
782 (1968). [A] short term in the county workhouse where all kinds and
conditions are huddled pell-mell, with work of the meanest character has no
beneficial effect upon the shiftless." Lisle, Vagrancy Law; Its Faults And
Their Remedy, 5 J. Cram. L.C. & P.S. 498, 511 (1915). The rate of recidivism
in vagrancy is convincing evidence that the traditional "get tough" attitude
accomplishes little or nothing towards solving the problem. Douglas, Va-
grancy And Arrest On Suspicion, 70 YArE L.J 1 (1960). Such problems
might be better resolved through social welfare and rehabilitation measures.
Note, Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 102 (1962). In
line with this reasoning, the court in Fenster held inappropriate the use of any
criminal penalties to effectuate such public interests advanced by the state.
Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1967).
14 1n State v. Gaynor, 119 N.J.L. 582, 197 A.360 (1938), the court
defined the vagrancy statute as a police regulation to prevent crime in the
future rather than as a means of punishing past or present conduct. In
Levine v. State, 110 N.J.L. 467, 166 A. 300 (1933), it was stated that the
vagrant was a type of nuisance, and that it was the undeniable duty of the
state to arrest those persons who would commit crime. The court further
stated that to deny the state this right was to question its right to punish the
crime itself.
's In Baker v. Binder, 274 F. Supp. 658, 662 (W.D. Ky. 1967), the
Kentucky vagrancy statute and several municipal ordinances were declared
unconstitutional. The district court stated that the statutes were an affront
to the due process clause of the Constitution of the United States by en-
couraging arbitrary arrests and convictions. The Supreme Court of Mas-
sachusetts in Alegata v. Commonwealth 353 Mass. 287, 231 N.E.2d 201 (1967),
held that the Massachusetts vagrancy statute was unconstitutional since it fur-
404 [Vol. 71
5
Cornelius and Stone: Constitutional Law--Vagrancy Ordinances--Their Future and Alterna
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1969
CASE COMMENTS
ment against most vagrancy offenses is that they are too vaguely
defined to satisfy the requirements of law imposed by the fourteenth
amendment."6 Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet
considered the constitutionality of criminal statutes directed toward
the status of vagrancy,'7 it has given some indication of how it might
view the vagrancy statutes. In Connally v. General Construction
Co.,8 the Court declared that "[a] statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application, violates the first essential of due process of law."
In addition to the vagueness question, the vagrancy laws also raise
other problems such as an imposition of a penalty based on
indigence,' 9 an imposition of involuntary servitude,2" a violation of
the commerce clause,2 an imposition of cruel and unusual punish-
nished a convenient tool for discrimination by prosecution officials against
particular classes. See also Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426,
282 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1967). For a more detailed discussion of vagrancy
statutes and due process see 9 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 1162, 1167 & n.28 (1968).
16 Supra note 3, at 790.
17 In Hicks v. District of Columbia, 383 U.S. 252 (1966), the Supreme
Court had an opportunity to consider this question, but upon rehearing, a
previously granted writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted.
In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas declared that the broad reach
of the vagrancy concept is patent and that the provision of the vagrancy
statute is too vague to meet the safeguarding standards of due process of law
in this country. He also stated that "I do not see how economic or social
status can be made a crime any more than being a drug addict can be." Id.
at 257.
18269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). In Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S.
451, 453 (1939), it was declared that "[n]o one may be required at peril of
life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All
are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids." In
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 540 (1948) (dissenting opinion), it was
stated that the vagrancy statutes are not fenced in by the text of the statute
or by he subject matter so as to give notice of the conduct to be avoided.
In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 572 (1965), it was declared that "gov-
ernment by the moment-to-moment opinions of a policeman on his beat is
not constitutional."
19Supra note 3, at 785. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956),
the Supreme Court broadly asserted that "[ufn criminal trials a State can no
more discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race
or color." Thus, strong rational justification should be required for vagrancy
statutes that directly impose criminal penalties on the basis of indigence.
Note, supra note 3, at 786. In Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184
(1941), it was stated that "a man's mere property status, without more,
cannot be used by a state (or a municipality) to test, qualify or limit his
rights as a citizen of the United States."
2oSupra note 3, at 786.
21 Making itinerancy an element of the offense tends to inhibit the free
movement of persons from state to state. Other measures restricting the
interstate movement of indigents have been held to violate the commerce
clause or the right of interstate travel. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
19691
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ment,22 and an infringement of the right against self-incrimination.23
Vagrancy laws have also experienced difficulty when applied and
enforced against activity protected by the Bill of Rights.2 4
In view of the preceding discussion, the status of the vagrancy laws
appears questionable. The susceptibility of these laws to a possible
Supreme Court declaration of invalidity necessitates some thought
as to a more stable alternative. In formulating an alternative, an
effort should be made to accomodate more effectively the interests
of the state, while at the same time to provide a maximum protection
of individual rights. The immensity of the problems involved evi-
dences the lack of a simple solution.
Recent Illinois legislation may provide some of the important steps
toward a possible alternative to the vagrancy laws. In completely
eliminating the vagrancy concept, the new Illinois Criminal Code
imposes sanctions only when there is clear and definite proof of the
commission of specific criminal acts.2 5 It is contended that the
interests of both society and the individual are more effectively
served by punishing specific acts when they occur rather than by
punishing a present status in anticipation of criminal conduct.2
Since seemingly no factual foundation has been established support-
22 Supra note 3, at 787-88. In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962), the Supreme Court invalidated, as imposing cruel and unusual
punishment, a California statute penalizing narcotic addiction. However, in
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), it was held that chronic alcoholism
is no defense to a charge of being intoxicated in public. It was stated that
the appellant was convicted, not for being a chronic alcoholic, but for being
drunk in public, and thus, as distinguished from Robinson, was not being
punished for a mere status. Id. at 532.
23 Many vagrancy statutes require the suspect to give a good account of
himself. It is questioned whether the suspect's refusal to supply incriminating
answers should be the basis for a vagrancy conviction. Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), requires the police interrogator to inform the suspect
of his right to remain silent, while the common vagrancy statute commands
the suspect to speak. This inconsistency may require the elimination of the
subsequent use of the suspect's statements as evidence against him. Supra
note 3, at 790.
14 In Baker v. Binder, 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D.Ky. 1967), civil rights
demonstrators sued in a federal court for declaratory relief against the
enforcement of certain state and municipal vagrancy statutes and ordinances.
The Court held unconstitutional vagrancy statutes combining loitering, idle-
ness, and indigence elements, holding them vague and grossly susceptible of
overreaching federal constitutional guarantees.
25 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 35-1 (1961), repealing ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 270 (1874). See conduct-criminality provisions formally covered under
typical vagrancy provisions: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 28-1 (gambling), §
11-14 (prostitution), § 26-1 (disorderly conduct), § 11-19 (pimping), § 11-16
(pandering) (1961).
26 Note, Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered, supra note 5, at 133,
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ing the proposition that society's interest in preventing crime has
been furthered by the proscription of the vagrancy status,"' perhaps
adherence to the concept of "conduct criminality" would be desirable.
Proponents of this concept contend that under properly drawn con-
duct statutes, the social interest of crime prevention is more effec-
tively accomodated. Under this approach, only those members of
the vagrancy status group actually engaging in criminal conduct
would be incarcerated. Also, it is argued that the punishment for
specific conduct violations can be applied commensurate with the
degree of the offense. 8
Individual rights might also be better protected through strict
reliance on "conduct criminality." In support of this contention,
three reasons are offered: first, statutes based on conduct provide
satisfactory criteria for the identification of the criminal and also
give the individual adequate notice of the consequences of specific
conduct; second, suspicion causation and the arbitrary attribution
of criminal responsibility is replaced by a clear causal relation be-
tween the proscribed conduct and the resulting harm; third, tangible
standards amendable to effective judicial supervision are provided
by "conduct criminality." Under this approach, selective enforce-
ment and arrests without merit are more easily revealed since there
is a clear delineation of the grounds for arrest and conviction.2 9
In addition to adherence to the "conduct criminality" concept,
the recent case of Terry v. Ohio' may provide another step toward
2
7
1d. at 119. Traditionally, crimes are defined as acts or omissions, and
it is usually stated that an act or omission is a necessary element of a crime.
It is argued that vagrancy is an exception to the foregoing statement, since it
is not dependent upon an act or omission but only upon one's certain condition
or character. Lacey, supra, note 5, at 1203. But see Perkins, supra note 6,
at 258-60.
28 Note, Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered, supra note 5, at 134.
29 Id. at 135.
30 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, an experienced police officer had ob-
served two men repeatedly walking past a store window and returning to an
"observation post." They were briefly joined by a third man, once more
commenced their ritual after his departure, and finally walked off to rejoin
him. Suspecting that the men were "casing" the store for an armed robbery,
the policeman approached them, identified himself, and asked their names.
When the men "mumbled something," the officer grabbed petitioner Terry,
spun him around and patted down the outside of his clothing. Feeling
a pistol in Terry's coat pocket, the officer seized it and then patted down
the other two men, discovering another weapon. Terry and the other armed
man were arrested and convicted of carrying concealed weapons. The Su-
preme Court, in affirming the conviction over petitioner's objection of an
unreasonable search, held that the on-the-spot police response involved in the
1969]
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a more satisfactory solution of the problems created by the vagrancy
laws. While an arrest on pure suspicion3 may encounter constitu-
tional difficulties, the United States Supreme Court recently held in
Terry that where a reasonable prudent police officer is investigating
suspicious conduct and is warranted in believing that his or others'
safety is endangered, he may make a reasonable search for weapons
of the person believed to be armed and dangerous, regardless of
whether he has had probable cause to arrest that individual for a
crime or whether he is absolutely certain that the individual is armed.
The Court concluded that the government's interest in control and
prevention of crime and the interest of the individual policeman in
protection from attack by suspected armed individuals whose con-
duct he is legitimately investigating are sufficient to justify a limited
search for weapons.32 It was recognized that the evidentiary standard
necessary to justify an intrusuion as a reasonable one, of which
probable cause is one example, will be determined by a balancing
process and will vary according to the respective strength of the
government's interest in initiating the search and the individual's
interest in seeking protection from the particular intrusion."
In light of the Terry decision, the way has been potentially cleared
for a new set of flexible police responses to problems of crime
control. 4 The existence of this new avenue of crime prevention is
significant in that it presents a voluntary or possibly involuntary
alternative to the vagrancy laws, depending upon their future treat-
ment by the courts. Since the vagrancy problem may outlive the
vagrancy laws, the alternatives provided by the conduct criminality
concept and the Terry decision should be given much consideration.
Douglas Alan Cornelius
Joseph Marshall Stone
stop and frisk situation is not the type of activity governed by the probable
cause standard of the warrant clause of the fourth amendment. See The
Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 82 HARv. L. REv. 63, 199 (1968).
31 Douglas, supra note 13, at 13.
32 The Supreme Court, supra note 30 at 179.
33 Id. at 181.
34 Id. at 184.
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